

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Hansen	CIA CONTROL NUMBER: 62477
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 14 Sept 51	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED: 14 Sep 51
COPY NUMBER (S): 3 of 4	LOGGED BY: mas
NUMBER OF PAGES: 1 DOCUMENT NO.	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: 1 by TS 36203 dtd 13 Sep 51	

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SMITTA SLIP

14 September 1951

DATE

TO:

SA/DCI (Mr. Jackson)


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Administration

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

This is the paper on which we have total concurrence from all the IAC agencies. I am going to recommend to the Director that it be sent in this form to NSC without further IAC consideration. May I have your concurrence?

Concur

STAT

FROM:

Col. C. B. Hansen

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220

EXTENSION

Copy 3 of 4.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence DATE: 14 September 1951

FOR IAC APPROVAL OF: Attached Draft of an Intelligence Enclosure for a Report
Updating NSC 68/4 (United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security)

Summary of Attached Enclosure:

- Paragraph 1. Intensification of intelligence is primarily a problem of obtaining qualified personnel.
2. Expansion is contemplated in Related Activities; armed forces should provide a portion of this personnel.
 3. Policies of NSC 86/1 are being studied in an effort to help fix more specifically interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping and welfare of defectors.
 4. Need for further emphasis on requirements, coordination, and periodic assessment of intelligence resources.
 5. Need for further examination of requirements and priorities in collection, especially from clandestine sources.
 6. Systematic analysis of Soviet economy should help in appraisal of capabilities and in search for vulnerabilities.
 7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means--but much remains to be done.
 8. Progress has been made in coordination but there is still room for improvement.
 9. IAC increasingly helpful in correlation among intelligence agencies.
 10. Watch Committee systematically reviews current indications.
 11. a. Increased difficulties anticipated in clandestine collection; will require more people and more money.
b. In the opinion of IAC representatives, presently directed personnel cuts will make it difficult for the armed forces intelligence services to maintain even minimum programs.
 12. a. Sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships spurs need for more and better intelligence. End product, however, will never fully satisfy policy-makers and planners.
b. Imperative that intelligence services obtain the personnel and logistical support required for fulfillment of their expanded tasks.

Action Taken:

1. Reviewed and concurred in by: DDCI, SA/DCI, DD/P (OO, OSO, OPC), DD/A, ONE, OCD, ORR, OCI, OSI, OIC, and OGC.
2. Reviewed and concurred in by the IAC agencies.

Recommendation:

1. Recommend attached revision of NSC 68/4 be dispatched to NSC without further IAC consideration.

C. B. Hansen
Colonel, USAF

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.

2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in clandestine intelligence and Related Activities. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being

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studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward recommending to NSC such action as may be appropriate.

4. To improve the overall value of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties are encountered.

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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.

8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordination, there is still need for improvement.

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9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.

10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military or political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by clandestine means, either directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine

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activities strain available resources of qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. In the opinion of the I.A.C. representatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and Related Activities. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and policy-makers desire.

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b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for the execution of these tasks.

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